Beyond the Mirror: The Problem of Connecting Sound to World
The Philosophical Inquiry Unit at the Institute tackles one of the most ancient and vexing meta-linguistic problems: the nature of reference. How is it that a sequence of sounds or marks—"tree," "liberty," "electron"—can somehow reach out and pick out an object, an abstract concept, or a theoretical entity in the world? The naive "naming" theory, that words are simple labels for pre-existing things, collapses under scrutiny. It fails for non-existent referents ("unicorn"), abstract concepts ("justice"), and terms whose meaning shifts with context ("here," "you"). The IML's approach is to treat reference not as a static, word-object pairing, but as a dynamic, multi-factor process embedded within communicative practices.
We host ongoing debates between proponents of major philosophical theories, using empirical data to test their limits. Descriptivist theories, holding that reference is achieved via a cluster of associated descriptions, are tested against cases of flawed knowledge (someone refers to "Feynman" while believing he was a pianist). Causal-historical theories, which posit a chain of usage linking back to an initial "baptism," are examined through studies of how reference evolves in scientific communities or online subcultures. Use-theoretic approaches, emphasizing the role of word function within a language-game, are explored through analyses of how terms like "friend" or "art" are deployed in different social contexts. Our researchers argue that no single theory is sufficient; reference is a hybrid process whose weighting of description, causation, and use varies with the type of term and the context of utterance.
Case Studies in Referential Complexity
A major research project investigates reference in specialized domains. In legal language, how does the term "reasonable person" refer? It clearly doesn't pick out a specific individual. Our analysis shows it functions as a conceptual blend—a simulated, normative agent constructed from societal norms and legal precedent. Its reference is fixed not by causation or description alone, but by its operational role in justifying judicial decisions. In scientific discourse, we track how terms like "gene" or "planet" undergo referential shifts. The referent of "planet" was not simply re-described when Pluto was reclassified; the very causal-historical chain of usage was deliberately altered by a governing body (the IAU), demonstrating the social-institutional dimension of reference for technical terms.
In everyday conversation, our experiments with ambiguous reference reveal the pragmatic scaffolding that supports it. If someone says, "The coffee is cold," successful reference to a specific cup depends on a shared perceptual field, joint attention, and default assumptions. We study breakdowns in reference, such as in Alzheimer's discourse or cross-cultural misunderstandings, to reverse-engineer the cognitive and social mechanisms that normally work seamlessly. These studies inform our model of reference as a cooperative achievement, a meeting of minds oriented towards a shared target, rather than a solitary speaker-word-world relation.
- Descriptivist Theories: Reference via associated descriptions or senses.
- Causal-Historical Theories: Reference via a historical chain of use from an initial event.
- Use-Theoretic Theories: Reference determined by role in a language-game or practice.
- Hybrid Models: Combining elements of causation, description, and use contextually.
- Social-Indexical Reference: Terms referring based on social identity or context (e.g., pronouns, honorifics).
Implications for Mind, Reality, and Ethics
This work has deep implications. For the philosophy of mind, it questions the nature of mental content: what does thinking about something consist of, if not a mental act of reference? Our collaboration with neuroscientists looks for correlates of different referential processes in the brain. For metaphysics, it challenges simplistic realist and anti-realist positions. The reference of "money" or "marriage" is clearly socially constructed, yet has real causal power. We develop frameworks for understanding the ontology of such institutional facts through their meta-linguistic grounding.
Ethically, the philosophy of reference is crucial. Hate speech and propaganda often operate by manipulating referential chains, linking ethnic or social groups to negative descriptions until the reference seems inherent. Understanding reference as a process exposes these manipulations and suggests interventions. Furthermore, in debates about AI rights, the question of whether an AI can truly "refer" to pain or joy (as opposed to simulating reference) is central. By clarifying the complex, embodied, and social prerequisites of reference, our work suggests that genuine reference may be inextricably tied to a form of life that includes vulnerability, community, and bodily existence. The Institute's pursuit of the philosophy of reference is thus not an arcane academic exercise, but a fundamental inquiry into how human symbols anchor us to reality and to each other, with profound consequences for law, science, ethics, and our understanding of what it means to be a meaning-making creature in a shared world.