Revisiting the Problem of Reference: From Words to Worlds
The philosophical problem of reference—how words hook onto things in the world—has perplexed thinkers for millennia. The classical view of direct reference struggles with abstract terms, fictional entities, and change over time. Meta-linguistics reframes the question. Instead of a single, mysterious link between word and object, we see reference as a function within a linguistic framework. A framework establishes conditions for what counts as an object, what properties are salient, and what kinds of statements can be made about them. The word 'electron' refers not to a pre-linguistic 'thing' but to a node in the framework of modern physics, defined by its role in a network of theories, equations, and experimental procedures. Similarly, 'justice' refers to a complex, culturally variable construct within a moral-legal framework. Reference, then, is not a simple naming but a successful navigation within a shared conceptual scheme. This framework-based view dissolves many classic paradoxes and aligns with how reference actually works in practice, from scientific discourse to everyday conversation.
Truth and Framework-Relativity
The concept of truth is similarly transformed. The correspondence theory of truth (a statement is true if it corresponds to reality) presupposes a language-independent reality to correspond to. Meta-linguistics, while not denying an external world, emphasizes that we only ever access and describe that world through a linguistic-conceptual framework. Therefore, truth is always framework-relative. The statement 'The sky is blue' is true within the everyday framework of human color perception under standard atmospheric conditions. The statement 'The sky is a scattering of electromagnetic radiation predominantly at wavelengths around 475 nanometers' is true within the framework of physics. They are not contradictory; they are truths relative to different descriptive frameworks. This does not lead to a debilitating relativism, but to a more sophisticated understanding of how truth claims function. It highlights the importance of specifying (or negotiating) the framework in which a statement is meant to be evaluated, a crucial skill in interdisciplinary dialogue and cross-cultural exchange.
The Nature of Meaning: Use, Practice, and Ecosystem
Philosophical theories of meaning have vacillated between mentalism (meaning is an idea in the head) and extensionalism (meaning is the set of things a word refers to). The meta-linguistic perspective, inspired by Wittgenstein's later work and embodied cognition, posits that meaning is rooted in social practice and cognitive ecology. The meaning of a word is its use within a form of life—the shared activities, goals, and perceptual experiences of a community. But meta-linguistics adds a layer: that use is structured by the overarching framework. The meaning of a chess piece like the 'queen' is defined by its rules of movement within the framework of chess, and its use in countless games. Similarly, the meaning of 'promise' is defined by the social and moral frameworks that give promises their force, and their use in binding agreements. Meaning is thus dynamic, distributed, and framework-dependent. This view connects semantics directly to pragmatics and to the study of how frameworks are learned and enacted, providing a more holistic and empirically grounded account of how language means.
Consciousness and the Limits of Linguistic Expression
A perennial philosophical mystery is the nature of conscious experience—qualia. How can the subjective feel of redness or pain be captured in language? Meta-linguistics addresses this by clarifying the limits of linguistic frameworks. Our frameworks are optimized for coordinating action, sharing information about a public world, and regulating social behavior. They are poorly equipped for direct, exhaustive description of private, subjective states. We use metaphors ('a stabbing pain,' 'a warm feeling'), analogies, and expressive sounds, but these are translations, not identical mappings. The 'hard problem' of consciousness may be, in part, a meta-linguistic problem: the mismatch between the qualitative nature of experience and the discursive, categorical nature of our primary communicative tool. This doesn't make consciousness ineffable, but it suggests that grasping it fully might require developing new, non-propositional modes of expression or shared attention—a frontier for both philosophy and meta-linguistic art. It humbles our linguistic pretensions while inspiring creativity in seeking beyond them.
By applying a meta-linguistic lens, the Institute brings fresh, empirically-informed perspectives to age-old philosophical puzzles. We show that many philosophical confusions arise from overlooking the framework-dependence of our concepts. Our work does not seek to dismiss philosophy but to partner with it, providing the detailed linguistic analysis that can ground abstract speculation. In doing so, we help build a philosophy of language that is not an isolated discipline, but an integrated part of the scientific and humanistic understanding of the mind, society, and the world we co-create through speech.